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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NO. 16620 
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN, dba 
NIELSEN'S CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CHIN-HSIEN WANG and 
LI RONG WANG, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a breach of contract action brought by 
both parties against each other for damages arising from 
the construction of respondents' house. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This matter was heard by the Honorable Dean E. 
Conder, sitting as the trier of fact. After a three day 
trial, the court found that appellant breached the con-
tract and was liable in damages to respondents. Appel-
lant's motion for a new trial was denied. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the judgment of the 
district court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about April 20, 1977, the appellant and 
respondents entered into a written contract wherein the 
appellant agreed to construct a house on respondents' 
lot for an agreed upon contract price of $76,000.00. 
The contract provided, among other things, that any 
change orders were to be in writing and signed by the 
parties. In addition, in the event of breach, the 
breaching party would pay the attorney's fees of the 
nonbreaching party. (R.P. 380-381, P's Exh.4). 
The price bid by the appellant to build res-
pondents' house was based upon a set of plans that were 
later rejected by the building inspector's office of Salt 
Lake City because of noncompliance with building and 
zoning laws. Thereafter, the plans were revised to com-
ply with the requirements of the building and zoning laws. 
The parties met and agreed to the building of the house 
in compliance with the revised plans. (R.P. 371, 416-417) 
Appellant, an experienced builder, knew the 
plans were modified and signed the plans, saying he would 
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build the house according to the modified plans. (R.P. 
289, 327-329). During the course of construction, appel-
lant did not present any change orders indicating that 
there were any changes in the construction between the 
two sets of plans, or indicating that the contract price 
for building the house under the revised set of plans 
would be any different than the contract price for build~ 
ing the house under the original set of plans. (R.P. 
305, 330, 521). Even though the.re were other changes 
made in the contract during the course of construction 
(P's Exh. 5 and 6), no demands were made on respondents 
to pay more than the contract price of $76,000.00 until 
the respondents were about to move into the house on 
December 31, 1977. At that time, appellant through his 
agent, LaMont Nielsen, demanded that respondents sign an 
agreement to pay $12,543.37 for "extras." (P's Exh. 10). 
Respondents refused to sign the agreement, maintaining 
that most of the items were not extras. 
The only changes ordered by respondents for 
which they were liable were additional heating runs, a 
butcher block, extra carpet and light fixtures, and a 
stained glass window, for a total cost of $1,523.37. 
The other items claimed by appellant to have been extras 
were contained in the original contract price bid by 
appellant to the respondents. (R.P. 204-205). 
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The appellant did not complete the house on 
the date set for completion. An addendum to the con-
tract provided that a $40.00 per day penalty would be 
paid by appellant if the house were not completed by 
December 15, 1977. (P's Exh. 5). On December 31, 1977, 
the appellant abandoned the contract before the house 
was completed pursuant to the terms of the agreement of 
the parties. Thereafter, the respondents were required 
to complete the house through their own labors, in 
obtaining subcontractors and performing services in 
completing the house following the abandonment of the 
contract by appellant. (R.P. 551-553). 
Following the abandonment of the contract by 
appellant, the respondents were required to engage sub-
contractors to perform a number of services in complet-
ing and repairing work left undone by appellant. The 
cost to respondents of repairing and completing 
appellant's work was $12,815.34. (R.P. 205-206). 
One of the terms of the parties' contract 
required appellant to protect respondents against any 
lien claims and to promptly pay and discharge any such 
liens. Because of appellant's refusal to pay his sub-
contractors and filing his own lien, numerous liens were 
filed against respondents' house. (R.P. 206-207). 
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Due to appellant's breach of contract it was 
necessary for respondents to retain legal counsel to 
represent them in actions by the subcontractors and 
appellant, By the terms of the parties' contract, 
appellant as the breaching party was required to pay 
respondents' attorney's fees. (P's Exh. 4). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS IDEA 
OF THE FACTS FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT WHERE THERE IS 
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT 
After a three day trial and a hearing on a 
motion for a new trial, appellant now asks this Court to 
reweigh the facts as contained in the 592 pages of the 
record and more than 55 exhibits, and substitute its 
idea of the facts for that of the trial court. In 
asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, appellant -is 
also asking that this Court abandon its long standing 
policy of not disturbing the findings and judgments of 
trial courts when those findings and judgments are based 
on substantial, competent evidence. Fisher v. Taylor, 
572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977). 
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The factual issues before the trial court were 
Was there a contract? 2. Was the contract 
3. What were the damages flowing from the 
Appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence 
on these issues to have the court rule in his favor. By 
contrast, respondents produced a preponderance of evi-
dence on these issues and the court ruled in their 
fa¥er, '!'be court was fully aware of the evidence and 
til!lillerated over a week before preparing a memorandum 
deci.sion. Appellant has failed to show any error by the 
trial court that would require this Court to reverse or 
lllCldify the judgment. 
Appellant's memorandum, and argument in 
support of his motion for a new trial were substantially 
the same argument as contained in his appeal brief. The 
trial court was fully apprised of the facts when it 
denied appellant's motion for a new trial. 
With two unsuccessful attempts at producing 
sufficient evidence to persuade the trier of fact, appel-
lant now approaches this Court for a third attempt at 
arguing factual issues decided by the trial court. It 
would be a grave injustice to the respondents and the 
trial court to reweigh the evidence where, as here, the 
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record shows that the findings and judgment of the trial 
court were based on substantial, ~ompetent evidence. 
II. THE THRUST OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS 
THAT HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINA-
TION OF THE FACTS 
A. Appellant is not entitled to the contract 
price where he failed to complete the contract. 
Appellant contends in his first argument that 
he is entitled to what it cost him to build the house, 
or in the very least, the.contract price. Respondents 
agree that the contract price for the house was 
$76,000.00. However, it does not follow that appellant 
is entitled to that amount. It is clear from the 
testimony at trial that respondents were obligated to 
pay appellant the contract price if the house was 
completed in conformity with the plans. No principle of 
law forces a party to a contract to pay the contract 
price when the other party fails to fully perform. The 
court found that the appellant did not complete the 
contract and as a result was not entitled to the 
contract price. 
Appellant agreed to build the respondents a 
house for $76,000.00. Whether it cost appellant that 
amount to build the house or cost him a million dollars 
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to build it, is immaterial. The evidence showed that 
the appellant failed to complete the house as agreed. 
Because of that failure, appellant was not entitled to 
r~ve the contract price. Watson Lumber Co. v. 
Guen~ewig, 79 Ill. App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270, 279 
(1967). 
As an additional ground for not awarding appel-
~ ~ balance of contract price, the trial court 
't a ' IDt: to reward respondents anything for their 
s JS "pep i.a acting as their own general contractor. The 
cour.t merely of~set the value of respondents' services 
~ .. -,amount that remained unpaid on the contract at 
the time appellant abandoned the contract. This subject 
m~~r was discussed by the court and counsel at the 
hear:in9 of appellant's motion for a new trial. 
B. The trial court did not err in awarding 
damages for appellant's failure to use the materials 
specified in the plans. 
Appellant misses the issue that was before the 
trial court as it pertained to the award of damages for 
aluminum siding. The issue of the aluminum siding was 
not whether the plans called for it or not, but rather, 
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whe the r appellant was liable for failing to use the 
materials specified in the plans. 
As the evidence at trial showed, the plans 
called for a prefinished hardwood board, a material 
which would require little or no painting. Appellant 
used a different material than called for in the plans 
and which required painting. The material was of such a 
nature that appellant's own subcontracter would not 
paint it. (R.P. 527-528, D's Exh. 18). 
Faced with the problem of tearing out the 
substitute material and replacing it with the material 
specified in the plans, and the option of covering the 
substitute material with aluminum siding (which would 
require no painting), the respondents chose the more 
economical option of merely covering the substitute 
material with aluminum siding. Had respondents chosen 
to replace the substitute material, the cost would have 
been even greater, since the material was already part 
of the house. 
Since appellant breached the contract by 
failing to use the materials designated in the plans, it 
follows that appellant is liable for damages in correct-
ing the defect. Accordingly, the court found that 
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appellant was liable to respondents for the cost of the 
'. aawninum siding. 
~~;,: .w j,- c. The trial court did not err in allowing 
~l;>' ll'SDS Mr. Wang to testify as the owner of the house 
• -· l· 
'sif ~-- 9eneral contractor • 
In Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
f·. ~-~--;·_• ;a5"1d·~ 101 (Utah 1978), this Court held that an owner 
"f, _.,. MCU!f as to the value of his property and that his 
tblllll•lll .. •rr should be given such weight and credibility as 
~;, • ¥Je~ of fact finds reasonable under the circumstan-
r:.\" ·~ ~,~·; ., ...,. .... ~ '!'~ ljt-"l 
'!'ti! -~,,.. As the owner of the house, and as the general 
~r~or who obtained subcontractors to complete the 
~-jlfter appellant breached and abandoned the 
..... ~t, respondent Mr. Wang was competent to testify 
~i'~' the cost of complefing and repairing the work 
~lant left unfinished or in a defective condition. 
Mii;:-, ,f11an9 1 s testimony as to the cost of these repairs was 
based upon h_is knowledge of what he paid to have the 
repairs done or what bids subcontractors gave him. 
(R.~. 527-538, 547-551). During Mr. Wang's testimony 
concerning the cost of completion and repairing defects, 
appellant's attorney did not object., Having waived his 
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right to object to the admission of the evidence, appel-
lant cannot now assert that an error was made. 
In addition to failing to object to Mr. Wang's 
testimony as to the cost of completion and repair, appel-
lant failed to produce any evidence on the items he now 
disputes. Appellant states at page 13 of his brief that 
the trial court awarded respondents $550.00 to repair 
the stained glass window. The $550.00 award was to 
repair both the stained glass window that had to be 
replaced because it was installed inside out and destroyed 
by the elements and the skylite window. The oourt also 
ordered respondents to pay $550.00 for the stained glass 
window itself, thereby requiring respondents to pay for 
the window as an extra and then allowing an offset in an 
equal amount for its replacement due to appellant's 
unworkmanlike installation, resulting in the window's 
destruction. 
II I. APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR EXTRAS NOT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT 
Appellant contends that respondents should be 
required to pay for extras in an amount of over 
$12,000.00. The only reason appellant gives for this 
contention is that he put that amount of materials and 
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labor into the house that were above the contract price. 
Pa~agraph 7 of the contract provides that any changes to 
th~ contract are to be in writing, signed by the parties 
-;.~@.set out the changes and adjustments to the contract 
tr:~ce. 
The evidence before the trial court clearly 
showed that appellant did not present any change orders 
or otberwise indicate to respondents that the contract 
........ to be greater than the agreed upon amount of 
llM; ....... 00. The court found that the only extras 
...,aered by respondents or received by them for which 
they were liable, were additional heating runs, a 
butcher block, extra carpet and light fixtures, and a 
stained glass window, for a total cost of $1,523.37. 
In denying appellant's request for over 
$12,000.00 in alleged extras, the trial court merely 
followed the contract of the parties and the general 
rule that a stipulation in a private building or con-
struction contract that extras must be ordered in 
writing is valid and binding upon the parties. As long 
as such a provision remains in effect, no recovery can 
be had for extras done without a written order in 
compliance therewith. 2 A.L.R.3d 620. 
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In Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill. 
App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270 (1967), the court was faced 
with a very similar problem to the issue of extras in 
the present action. There, the contractor claimed a 
right to extra compensation for over 48 items of labor 
and materials. The contractor had a complete knowledge 
of the plans and prepared the contract price with the 
plans in mind. In reversing the trial court's award to 
the contractor of $27,500.00 in extras, the appellate 
court noted that the burden of proof was on the 
contractor to show by clear and convincing evidence the 
following elements: (1) the·work was outside the scope 
of his contract promises; (2) the extra items were 
ordered by the owner; (3) the owner agreed to pay extra, 
either by his words or conduct; (4) the extras were not 
furnished by the contractor as his voluntary act; and 
(5) the extra items were not rendered nec~ssary by any 
fault of the contractor. 
In Watson Lumber as in the present case, the 
contractor did not request any payment for the extras 
until he requested the balance of the contract price, 
and claimed the home was complete. Since the contractor 
assumed the risk of building the owners' house at a 
fixed price, he could not recover for extras on discov-
ering he made a mistake on his estimate or that the work 
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was more difficult than he anticipated. Because the 
~tractor failed to prove by clear and convincing evi-
ID!noe that he was entitled to extras, the appellate 
C9111~ reversed the trial court's decision. In addition, 
~, appellate court rejected the contractor's argument 
~~t_he was entitled to the full contract price even 
~ the house was not completed. In rejecting this 
it clear that in order to 
• Q4 <the full contract price, the contract had to be 
~ performed. 
,:> "- similarly in the present case, appellant has 
•···· ~led in its burden to prove that respondents were 
:"'"-." 
liable for additional extras than the court awarded him. 
~~ant did not make a demand for the alleged extras 
~il the day respondents were to move into the house. 
~dents have vigorously denied that they were liable 
fo~ any extras not ordered by the court. Based upon the 
Watson Lumber case and the failure of appellant to show 
he was entitled to additional extras, it is clear that 
the trial court did not err in failing to award appel-
lant anything for his alleged additional extras. 
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IV. UNDER THE PARTIES' CONTRACT, RESPONDENTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE IN DEFENDING 
THIS APPEAL 
The contract of the parties provided that in 
the event of a breach, the breaching party was required 
to pay to the other party all damages incurred, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee. Pursuant to this con-
tractual provision, the trial court awarded respondents 
$7,500.00 in attorney's fees. 
Since respondents have been forced to defend 
this appeal, they should be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee for this case on appeal. A majority of 
modern courts who have specifically dealt with this 
issue have allowed attorney's fees on appeal. In ~ 
Jones Construction Co. v. Duncan Crane & Rigging, Inc., 
2 Wash. App. 509, 468 P.2d 699 (1970), a contractor sued 
its subcontractor for damages resulting from breaqh of 
, 
the subcontract. The court reasoned that since the 
contract provided for a recovery of attorney's fees, it 
followed that a reasonable attorney's fee must be 
allowed for legal services on appeal. 
Similarly in another action for breach of a 
construction contract, Mersnon Gimeno Construction Co. 
v. Robinson, 534 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1975), the court 
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~ additional attorney's fees incurred to the 
~~ling party who had to defend the judgment of the 
·ttRel court. For examples of other cases allowing 
~,·e fees on appeal where the contract provides 
!lC; a~\qrney's fees, see Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 Ariz. 
iJif·! .}'7 •~2d 636 (1961); Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal. 2d 
~ i~~ P.2d 725, 5 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960); 52 A.L.R.2d 
-...~ .. 
Although this Court has held that attorney's 
."°~·~al are discretionary, Swain v. Salt Lake 
•:1M$.f.~ & Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 2d 
• ~9ij:5), in light of the position of the majority of 
·~ oaurts, it is respectfully submitted that this 
'!Pf~ a.!dopt the majority position on this issue. 
~,if this Court adheres to its decision in Swain, 
~ ~ts of this case make it a proper one for the 
~ OQ.~rt;. to award attorney's fees to respondent on this 
appeal, if respondents prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing appeals from trial court findings 
and judgments this Court has wisely refused to disturb 
them when they are based on substantial, competent evi-
dence. Appellant has failed to show that there was not 
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such evidence to support the judgment of the trial 
court. 
The trial court's judgment was based on sub-
stantial, competent evidence and for the reasons stated 
herein, that judgment should be affirmed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
respondents' attorney's fees in defending this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J)~s-,~ 
/WENDELL E. BENNET'!' 
Attorney for Respondents 
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